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This article uses the analytical framework of “Europeanization” to assess whether and 
how EU conditionality has led to change in Albania’s migration policy. The analysis 
focuses on a specific but crucial aspect of migration policy: the readmission of irregu-
lar migrants. The examination of change in Albanian readmission policy demonstrates 
that the country has not only accepted the legal obligation to take back its citizens resid-
ing illegally in the EU and nationals of other countries who had reached the EU via 
Albania. It has also created the institutional and procedural conditions for implementa-
tion of those legal obligations, and statistical data demonstrate that Albania is accepting 
all the illegal immigrants returned by the EU member states. The article shows that this 
policy change took place after the EU made Albania’s progress towards accession 
conditional on compliance in this policy area. In addition to establishing the temporal 
covariation of EU pressure and domestic change, this work will explore the causal 
mechanism linking the two variables by examining the motivation of the actors involved 
in policy change. Thus, the analysis will identify the domestic factors that make pos-
sible the EU impact. This article demonstrates the crucial importance of gate-keeping 
in ensuring compliance. The control by the EU of access to each stage of the preacces-
sion process is such a powerful motivating instrument that it can outweigh very high 
domestic costs and lead to developments in the aspirant country that are solely in the 
interest of the EU.
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The literature on European Union (EU) enlargement has identified a significant influence of the EU on the process of post-communist transformation in Central 
and Eastern Europe.1 This article demonstrates that the EU influence on countries 
aspiring to membership can reach the extent of inducing a country of massive illegal 
emigration and whose economy relies heavily on migration to take back its citizens 
residing illegally in the EU. Indeed, Albania is a country from which a total of nearly 
six hundred thousand had moved abroad by 2001, representing nearly 20 percent 
of the Albanian population.2 This migration is characterized by a high degree of 
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irregularity with clandestine departures and a large proportion of migrants classed as 
“illegal” and “undocumented” in host countries.3 Studies show that migrant remit-
tances are vital to keep the country’s economy going, contributing about 14 percent 
of GDP.4 Under these circumstances, one would expect Albanian policy makers not 
to be interested in the readmission of irregular migrants as a tool for a strict control 
of migration from the country into the EU states. And yet the EU was able to compel 
Albania to sign in 2005 a Readmission Agreement whereby the country committed 
to take back its citizens residing illegally in the EU and to accept nationals of other 
countries who had passed through Albania prior to entering the EU. Readmission 
agreements (RAs) have emerged as one of the main instruments for achieving the EU 
objective to involve countries of origin and transit in the fight against illegal immigra-
tion. An RA is expected to reduce illegal migration from the concerned country, and 
as such it is an important element of the development of migration management in 
the country.5
This article asks what made possible such an impact of the EU on the development 
of Albanian migration policy. Given that this is a question related to the domestic 
impact of the EU, I use “Europeanization” as the analytical framework to address it. 
The concept of Europeanization has been used mainly to analyze the EU impact on 
its member states. According to this conceptual framework, the degree of impact of 
the EU rules and procedures depends on (1) the different degrees of adaptational 
pressure EU rules and procedures create and (2) the presence of facilitating domestic 
factors.6 Whereas in the literature on Europeanization of existing member states the 
different degrees of adaptational pressure depend on the goodness of fit between EU 
regulations and domestic regulations and procedures, studies of Europeanization in 
countries aspiring to EU membership point out that EU pressure does not emanate 
only from that misfit. The political relationship of the EU with these countries is 
based on conditionality. Therefore, studies of Europeanization in the accession coun-
tries typically analyze the effects of EU conditionality and point to its strength and 
effectiveness.7 Theoretically, the work on Europeanization in accession countries is 
rooted in institutionalist theory. The dominant theoretical debate of the 1990s between 
rationalist institutionalism and constructivist or sociological institutionalism provided 
the theoretical basis for the explanation of the EU influence on accession countries. 
Studies that analyze the effects of EU conditionality start from the rationalist assump-
tion that cost-benefit calculations of the governments in accession countries deter-
mine the extent of compliance with EU conditionality: there will be good compliance 
outcome if the benefits of accepting EU demands outweigh the costs for the govern-
ments.8 Research on Europeanization in accession countries has identified the mem-
bership prospect as the most important benefit in the eyes of the decision makers 
in accession countries. Thus, with these countries the EU has at its disposal coercive 
mechanisms of influence, the most important of which is gate-keeping.9 The acces-
sion process is constituted by stages, such as the association agreement, the opening 
of negotiations, their conclusion, and the accession treaty, that constitute a sequence 
Dedja / EU Conditionality in the Area of Migration Policy  3
of moving into an ever-closer relationship with the EU. The control by the EU of the 
access to each of these stages constitutes a powerful mechanism for the EU to secure 
compliance with its conditions by the aspirant country, as the EU can attach to par-
ticular stages in the accession process conditions whose fulfillment is particularly 
important for the Union.
This article will show in its first section that gate-keeping was the crucial element 
of the EU strategy to induce Albania to comply with EU demands in the area of read-
mission policy. Readmission policy places the concept of Europeanization in a context 
different from the traditional adoption of EU rules by the countries aspiring to mem-
bership. EU demands in the area of readmission are simply the signature of a read-
mission agreement—whereby the country accepts the legal obligation to take into 
its territory its citizens residing illegally in the EU and the citizens of third countries 
who have entered the Union via that country—and the creation of the conditions for 
the implementation of the agreement. The EU pressure for adaptation does not stem 
from the formal process of adoption of EU rules and procedures as in the more tra-
ditional Europeanization studies. The pressure is of a more political and informal 
nature: the EU made progress in the negotiation and signature of the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with Albania—an important stage in the process that 
leads to accession—conditional on the signature of the readmission agreement. 
This approach was an element of a development of the external dimension of EU 
migration policy that has led to an increasing salience of migration objectives in 
the relations of the Union with third countries. This development reached a critical 
juncture in the Seville European Council in 2002, where it was decided that inad-
equate cooperation by a third state in this policy area could hamper further develop-
ment of the relations with the EU, following a systematic assessment of relations 
with that country. As a result, as of 2002, Albania’s progress towards accession has 
been made to a very significant extent conditional on compliance with migration policy 
conditionality.
The article will then explore in its second section how Albanian policy on read-
mission developed after this critical juncture, in order to establish whether the EU 
strategy of making progress towards accession dependent on compliance with the 
EU migration-related demands has led to policy change in Albania. Thus, the second 
section will examine the obligations taken by Albania through the signature of 
the RA and the implementation of these commitments, that is, the establishment 
in Albania of mechanisms and procedures for readmission, as well as operational 
results as demonstrated by statistical data on readmission. This analysis will dem-
onstrate very good results in Albania’s compliance with the EU demands in the area 
of readmission after the EU made progress towards accession conditional on this 
compliance. An important challenge in this context is to establish the causal relation-
ship, that is, whether the observed domestic developments have been caused by the 
EU pressure. This is a general methodological challenge of Europeanization research.10 
My strategy for demonstrating the causal importance of the EU is to pay particular 
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attention to the temporal patterns by establishing a critical juncture in the development 
of the EU strategy and by examining whether there is domestic change in Albania 
after this critical juncture.
In addition to establishing the temporal covariation of EU pressure and domestic 
change, the last section of this work will explore the causal mechanism linking the 
two variables. The connection between EU pressure and domestic change will be 
rendered visible by examining the motivation of the actors involved in policy change 
in Albania. After having identified high social costs of compliance with EU demands 
in the area of readmission, I will explore why Albanian decision makers accepted EU 
conditions in this area despite these costs. This analysis will be based on interviews 
with negotiators of the RA and other officials involved in readmission, public declara-
tions of representatives of the Albanian government and of political parties, as well 
as an analysis of press reports on the matter. This analysis will demonstrate that the 
domestic factors that made possible the effectiveness of EU conditionality are, first, 
a ruling elite willing to comply because of the importance it attaches to progress in 
the preaccession process and, second, a domestic structure where social forces have 
little influence on policy making and where policy change depends on the preferences 
of policy makers. The analysis of enlargement politics in the country, which deter-
mines why decision makers attach very high importance to progress towards acces-
sion, is beyond the scope of this article. So is the analysis of state-society relations in 
Albania. However, this article will determine that in relation to readmission policy, 
there was not any truly informed public debate on policy choices. Thus, the decision 
makers acted insulated from societal pressure and imposed their policy choices on a 
pliant population. In the terminology of Europeanization research, this type of state-
society relation is a facilitating factor for compliance in that it leads to an absence of 
veto points in the domestic structure.11
The EU Strategy to Obtain Compliance  
with Its Migration-Related Demands
The literature on the EU migration policy has identified an ever-increasing focus on 
the development of the external dimension of EU immigration policy, that is, a series 
of measures and instruments the Union has adopted to engage countries of origin and 
transit in the control of migration flows.12 Indeed, the development of EU immigration 
policy has focused on aims—such as fighting illegal migration, securing expulsion 
and readmission of illegal immigrants by their countries of origin or transit—for 
which the cooperation of the countries of origin and transit is fundamental. What is 
the strategy of the Union to motivate these countries? A first attempt to define this 
strategy was made in 1999 at the Tampere European Council, which called for a “com-
prehensive approach” to migration policy. The Council established that “all compe-
tences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external 
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relations must be used in an integrated way to build an area of freedom, security and 
justice.”13
What did this “comprehensive approach” mean in the efforts to implement it? In 
the Conclusions of the Seville European Council of June 2002, it was agreed that 
inadequate cooperation by a third state in the area of migration policy could hamper 
further development of relations with the EU, following a systematic assessment of 
relations with that country.14 It seems that the “comprehensive approach” would 
mean that the Union would make the development of its overall relations with coun-
tries of origin and transit of illegal migration dependent on their cooperation in this 
policy area. This strategy can be particularly effective with countries aspiring to 
accession: their relationship with the EU is based on conditionality. The Union sets 
conditions whose fulfillment makes possible the country’s progress towards acces-
sion. If the applicant country is one of origin or transit of illegal migration, then the 
application of the “Seville Strategy” would mean that the Union would accord over-
whelming importance to migration policy conditionality, and the overall progress 
towards accession would become conditional on compliance with migration policy 
conditionality.
This approach is embodied in the strategy of the Union to induce Albania to com-
ply with the EU demands in the area of return and readmission of illegal immigrants. 
The strategy adopted by the Union in this particular case demonstrates clearly that the 
control by the EU of the access to each of the stages of the accession process can be 
used as a powerful mechanism for the EU to secure compliance with its conditions 
by the aspirant country.
The return of persons illegally residing in the EU figures prominently in the European 
Community migration policy since its establishment through the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The Treaty conferred to the Community the power to adopt measures in the area of 
“illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal resi-
dents.”15 When establishing how to implement the new treaty provisions, the member 
states concluded that readmission agreements would constitute a valuable instrument 
of an active return policy.16 The Tampere European Council in October 1999 invited 
the Council to start concluding readmission agreements with relevant third countries.17 
However, return measures by definition require the cooperation of another state, that 
is, the country of origin or transit. Therefore, when discussing the implementation of 
the “comprehensive approach” to migration policy, the Seville European Council of 
June 2002 asked for the development of an EU Return Action Program that would 
envisage the use of all appropriate instruments available in the context of the Union’s 
external relations to further negotiations of readmission agreements with third coun-
tries.18 The Seville European Council also established that each future EU association 
or cooperation agreement should include a clause on “joint management of migration 
flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.” In the same 
year (2002), the European Commission (EC) referred to a necessary “complementa-
rity [of EU migration policy] with other Community policies in order to help achieving 
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the Community’s objectives in the field of return and readmission.” Return and read-
mission, the EC recognized, “are solely in the interest of the Community, their success-
ful conclusion depends very much on the ‘leverage’ at the Commission’s disposal.”19
The Justice and Home Affairs Council in April 2002 established the criteria for 
selection of countries with which to conclude readmission agreements: the migration 
pressure exerted by the country, its geographical position in relation to the EU, and 
consideration of geographical balance and regional coherence.20 Albania was one of 
the eleven countries that, on the basis of these criteria, were identified as the first 
group of countries with which the Union would negotiate RAs.21 Already in 1999 
Albania had been identified by a report of the EU High Level Working Group on 
Asylum and Migration22 as a critical factor in the trajectory of irregular migration 
into the EU.23 This report provides insights into the concerns of the EU about 
irregular migration from and through Albania. The report stresses the country’s pov-
erty with “young people out of work and constituting a large . . . migration poten-
tial.24 Albania is considered a country of origin and a country of transit for Kurds, 
Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese who reach Italy through Albania.25 As a result of 
this importance attributed by the EU to Albania as source and transit of irregular 
migration, Albania was, among those selected for the negotiation of a RA, the only 
country with a European accession prospect and, thus, the only one for which gate-
keeping and conditionality was used to obtain cooperation in the readmission of 
irregular migrants.
The European accession prospect was offered explicitly to Albania at the Feira 
European Council in June 2000, which stated that all the countries of the Western 
Balkans are “potential candidates” for EU membership.26 The preaccession process 
for this region was denominated by the EU as “Stabilization and Association Process” 
to emphasize the European perspective as the stabilizer of the region after the wars of 
the 1990s. The centerpiece of the Stabilization and Association Process, as defined 
in the Zagreb Summit in November 2000,27 is the conclusion of a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA). The association established by the agreement is based 
on the gradual implementation of a free trade area and reforms designed to achieve 
the adoption of EU standards with the aim of taking the countries closer to EU acces-
sion. Thus, the SAA is the first important stage in the sequence of steps leading to 
accession. The formal conditions for the opening of SAA negotiations are related 
to the country’s capacity to take on the obligations of an SAA. However, in the case 
of Albania, the EU tied the negotiation of the SAA to the negotiation of the RA. 
Negotiations for both agreements were opened in 2003. While the two agreements 
were being negotiated in parallel, in March 2003 the EC pointed out that “Albania 
should pay particular attention to the Justice and Home Affairs sector if it is to make 
meaningful progress in the Stabilization and Association process” and added that 
“the negotiation and conclusion of a readmission agreement at Community level is 
essential.”28
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The minutes of the RA negotiations and personal communications with Albanian 
negotiators29 reveal clearly that the desire to make progress in the negotiation of the 
SAA motivated the Albanian authorities to accept the conditions of the RA proposed 
by the EU. The main negotiating point raised by the Albanian negotiators was the 
request to tie the signature of the RA to the signature of the SAA. The Albanian 
negotiators asked for the inclusion in the RA’s preamble of a statement that this 
agreement was concluded in accordance with Article 81 of the draft SAA30 and was 
part of the negotiations for the conclusion of the SAA.31 The EU negotiators con-
sented to this request.32 Albania also asked that “the RA enter into force simultane-
ously with the SAA, since it constitutes a direct obligation of the contents of article 
81 of the draft SAA.”33 The EU representatives pointed out that the RA would be 
ratified by the European Parliament, whereas the SAA would have to be ratified by 
all the member states, which could take up to two years.34 All the Albanian negotia-
tors interviewed considered the conclusion of the RA inevitable as a precondition for 
the SAA and progress in getting closer to the EU. Questioned on whether Albania 
could have negotiated better conditions for the RA, the Albanian negotiators recog-
nized the weakness of their position. The EU having put the conclusion of the agree-
ment as a precondition for progress in the relations of the EU with the country, they 
felt they had to accept it.
The Development of Albania’s Policy on Readmission
This section will explore how Albanian policy on readmission developed after 
the critical juncture constituted by the Seville European Council by examining the 
legal obligations taken by Albania through the RA and the implementation of these 
commitments, that is, the establishment in Albania of mechanisms and procedures 
for readmission, as well as operational results as demonstrated by statistical data on 
readmission.
The Legal Obligations of the RA
The RA was negotiated in three rounds in May, September, and November 2003. 
It was ratified by the European Parliament in early September 2005 and by the 
Albanian Parliament in January 2006 and entered into force on May 1, 2006. The 
negotiations were conducted on the basis of the standard draft-text of RA submitted 
to the Albanian authorities by the EC. As discussed in the previous section, the main 
negotiating point raised by the Albanian negotiators was the request to tie the signa-
ture of the RA to the signature of the SAA.
As regards the negotiation of the obligations to be taken by Albania through the 
RA, the Albanian negotiating team focused on timing and Albania’s capacity to meet 
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obligations arising from the Third Country Nationals (TCN) clause that establishes 
Albania’s obligation to readmit third country and stateless persons illegally pres-
ent on the EU member states’ territories having entered via Albania. The Albanian 
team claimed that the country did not have the capacity to implement the TCN clause 
due to
• total lack of reception capacities and of the administrative structures to deal with 
readmission of TCNs,
• very high costs related to reception of TCNs,
• expected difficulties in concluding readmission agreements with third countries of 
origin, and
• lack of a national legislative framework for readmission of TCNs.
On these grounds, Albania at first demanded a five-year derogation period for the 
entry into force of the TCN clause. The EC negotiators pointed out that it would 
take three years to sign and ratify the agreement, and with a two-year derogation 
period, Albania would have five years to build the capacities for the implementa-
tion of the TCN clause.35 Albania accepted the two-year derogation period (Article 
[Art.] 22.3, RA).
Albania tried to negotiate the return procedures, but the EU position was that 
according to Art. 19 of the draft-text, these procedural technicalities would be estab-
lished in bilateral implementation protocols that Albania would conclude with the 
member states and the EC-Albania RA would not include such technicalities. The 
Albanian team consented to defining return technicalities in implementation proto-
cols while accepting all the procedural obligations of the RA.36 Thus, Albania accepted 
that the Albanian nationality or transit through Albania be established on the basis of 
prima facie evidence furnished by the authorities of the member states (Art. 2.1 and 3.1). 
Prima facie evidence includes documents, certificates and bills of any kind, tickets, 
and statements by witnesses (Annexes 2 and 3, RA). Albania accepted to reply to 
readmission applications within a maximum of fourteen calendar days (as proposed 
by the EC, and not twenty-one days as initially requested by the Albanian side) and 
also accepted that if there was no reply within this time limit, the transfer be deemed 
to have been agreed to (Art. 10.2). Albania accepted to issue the person whose read-
mission has been accepted with the travel document required for his or her return 
within fourteen calendar days, or otherwise accept the use of the EU standard travel 
document for expulsion purposes (Art. 2.2 and 3.3).
The EC accepted the Albanian request to include an additional clause on readmis-
sion by error, according to which a member state shall take back any person readmit-
ted by Albania, if it is established, within a period of three months after the transfer 
of the person concerned, that the requirements for establishing that the person is an 
Albanian national or transited through Albania were not met (Art. 12).
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In conclusion, Albania accepted almost all the obligations of the draft-RA sub-
mitted by the EC. The only substantial changes requested by Albania and accepted 
by the EC were the two-year derogation from the TCN clause and the additional 
clause on readmission by error.
Implementation Results
To examine the implementation of the obligations taken by Albania through the 
RA, the following analysis will focus on the institutional and procedural change in 
the area of readmission, as well as the operational results as demonstrated by statisti-
cal data on readmission. This analysis is based on a review of the legislative measures 
in this area, on interviews with officials involved in the return of irregular migrants, 
and on reports of the EC and of the Albanian government.
As regards institutional change, the Department for Border and Migration (DBM) 
was established in October 2004 in the Ministry of Interior (MoI). It is responsible 
for all matters related to border and migration, including readmission.37 Prior to this 
date, competencies for these questions were divided between several entities within 
the ministry, and no one entity had overall responsibility for handling irregular 
migrants. In 2007 a Migration and Readmission Department was established within 
the DBM in the MoI. This department has a special unit dealing with readmission 
issues that is responsible for coordinating with foreign migration services and 
operative border police units for the readmission of Albanian and foreign citizens. 
Prior to this date, responsibility for return and readmission issues was allocated to a 
single specialist in the Unit for the Treatment of Foreigners and Migration.38
The actual readmission of irregular migrants into Albanian territory is respon-
sibility of the Border Police. The recent Law on State Police creates special sectors 
for migration and readmission issues in all eight regional departments of the bor-
der police. In the majority of border crossing points where the readmission proce-
dures take place, specific admission facilities have been set up. The personnel 
have been trained for the reception, interviewing, and selection of the returned 
persons. As of 2009, a separate item of the budget of the Border and Migration 
Directorate will be allocated for the expenses of readmission.39
As regards readmission procedures, before the entry into force of the RA with the EC, 
readmission of irregular migrants was taking place on the basis of bilateral readmis-
sion agreements. Each bilateral agreement was using different forms and contained 
different articles. Hence there existed a range of implementation procedures and 
responsible entities and a resulting lack of a clear readmission procedure and of 
clearly defined institutional structures and responsibilities. In practice, according to 
the Albanian border officials, Albanian citizens were returned to Albania by relevant 
authorities in EU member states without prior contact with Albanian authorities. 
This has occurred especially with Italy and Greece. Returns from these countries 
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were taking place at the border, and all procedures were carried out at the respective 
border points directly and without the involvement of the central structures. In most 
cases, Albanian authorities were only informed of the return once the individual had 
arrived on the territory of Albania and had been registered by the Border Police. There 
have been several reported cases where border authorities did not receive prior noti-
fication of the returnee’s arrival.40 Thus, official procedures of notification, as out-
lined in bilateral RAs, were not observed by the EU member states. A considerable 
number of Kosovars and Macedonians of Albanian ethnicity have been returned to 
Albania.41 Hence the request of the Albanian negotiating team for inclusion in the 
RA of the article on readmission in error.
The entry into force of the RA with the EC should have put an end to this proce-
dural disorder. According to the RA, when an individual request for readmission has 
been submitted by the requesting authority to the responsible Albanian readmission 
entities, readmission can only take place after an official response has been made by 
the Albanian authorities (the fourteen-day rule). This procedure should increase the role 
of DBM and enable the collection and centralization of data, verification of requests, 
and authorization of readmission procedures. With procedures centralized by DBM, 
the verification of the identity of the person to be returned should be carried out by 
the DBM before the return takes place. The DBM notifies the border authorities on 
future returns. When the readmissions were taking place without prior notification, 
the Albanian returnees were kept at the border until their identity was verified and the 
police made sure they were not wanted for criminal acts. This process of verification 
used to last eight to ten hours, with the returnees being kept at the border crossing 
points. With the entry into force of the RA with the EC, the verification should be 
carried out by the DBM to avoid the problem of long verification periods. Thus, the 
observation of the agreement’s readmission procedures could constitute a benefit for 
Albanian authorities.
However, data from the MoI42 demonstrate that to date, the entry into force of 
the RA has left the situation unchanged. Of the 66,009 returns in the course of 2008, 
only 654 were carried out after preliminary notification. The bulk of these returns 
were from Greece: 63,555 Albanian citizens were returned in 2008. For none of 
these was the procedure of prior notification observed. Ironically, Greece has 
demanded the observation of the RA procedures when asked to readmit 32 Afghan 
nationals that had entered Albania from Greece.43 When the issue of violation 
of the return procedures was raised by Albania with the EC, the latter suggested 
that Albania should address the issue with the members states in the implementing 
protocols.44
Even in these conditions of violation of return procedures by the EU member 
states, since the entry into force of the RA, the DBM at the MoI has processed all the 
requests for readmission of Albania citizens. In the course of 2008, 66,009 Albanian 
citizens residing illegally on EU territory were returned.45 Six of these requests have 
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been refused until September 2008 due to insufficient information or because the 
person was not an Albanian citizen.46
Measures to Implement the Obligation  
to Admit Third-Country Nationals
The implementation of the clause relating to TCNs constitutes a major challenge 
for the Albanian government. There is a risk that it could create a situation where 
TCNs are returned to Albania without being able, or willing, to return to their coun-
tries of origin, with an irregular situation in Albania and with little expectation of 
being able to reenter the EU. In other words, it could create what has been called a 
“readmission trap.”47
The first challenge for Albania was to establish the legal framework to deal with 
irregular migrants in the country. Until 2006, there were no legal provisions on 
irregular migrants in Albania. Following the “prescreening procedure” introduced in 
2001,48 when irregular migrants were identified on Albanian territory or at the border, 
they were referred to an interagency roving team, made up of representatives from 
the UNHCR, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and MoI’s Directorate for Asylum 
and Refugees, which were expected to provide an early indication as to whether an 
individual apprehended by the authorities might be a refugee, economic migrant, or 
victim of trafficking. Once this prescreening had taken place, these returnees were 
referred to the relevant authority so that they could apply for asylum; be provided 
further assistance at the national center for Victims of Trafficking; or take advantage 
of an IOM program for voluntary return, if the individual wished to return voluntarily 
to his or her country of origin. Individuals who did not fall into one of the categories 
defined above, that is, individuals who were not asylum seekers, self-declared victims 
of trafficking, or individuals who wished to return voluntary to their country of origin, 
fell out of this system and were not provided for within any specific regime.
This situation was overcome through an Instruction of Minister of Interior no. 
1085, of June 12, 2008, “On the Procedure to Be Implemented by the State Police 
for Selection of Irregular Foreigners at the Border”; and the Law no. 9959 of July 17, 
2008, “On Foreigners.”49 In the event of illegal stay in the territory by a citizen of a 
foreign country an order of expulsion is issued, implying the irregular foreigner’s 
voluntary departure. In the event of failure to leave voluntarily within the time period 
determined in the expulsion order, an expulsion order through coercion shall be 
issued. The individual shall be detained in a closed center until the expulsion order 
is enforced; this period can last up to six months, and on justified grounds it can be 
extended for six more months.
The number of removals of irregular migrants from Albania to the countries of 
origin is clearly increasing, though still at a very low level in absolute figures: from 
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nine in 2006 to thirty-six in 2007.50 In 2008, ninety-three irregular foreigners were 
removed from Albania.51 However, Albania faces serious obstacles in carrying out 
effective and sustainable removals to countries of origin. A major issue here is the 
conclusion of readmission agreements between Albania and the countries of origin. 
The only non-EU state with which Albania has managed to conclude a readmission 
agreement is Macedonia. Negotiations are under way with other countries of the 
region: Moldavia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia.52 Of these coun-
tries, only Moldavia is considered by the Albanian officials to be an important coun-
try of origin of irregular immigrants in Albania.53 No readmission agreement is being 
negotiated with any Asian country. This is hardly surprising given the difficulties of 
the EU itself to conclude readmission agreements with countries of origin of irregular 
immigrants.54 There is hardly anything Albania can offer these countries in return for 
the signature of a readmission agreement.
This situation poses the problem of dealing with irregular migrants who cannot be 
immediately removed. While facilities exist for accepting victims of trafficking and 
asylum seekers, until recently there were no such facilities for irregular migrants. A 
Centre for Administrative Detention of Illegal Foreigners has been constructed with 
EC financial assistance. It will receive irregular foreigners in Albania, with a capac-
ity of maximum two hundred persons (a capacity of up to one hundred persons and 
augmentation possibility of capacity for another one hundred). The construction was 
completed at the end of 2008, and the center is to become operational in the course 
of 2009.55 The construction and operation of this detention facility constitutes a heavy 
burden on the small state budget of Albania. While funds have been allocated for the 
construction of the center, the Albanian state budget will have to allocate resources 
for running the center. The risk is that without adequate funding, the detention of 
irregular migrants would not respect the basic principles of humane treatment. In 
addition to the detention center, the selection of the foreigners at the border envisaged 
by the Instruction of the MoI requires transit reception centers at the border crossing 
points. By the end of 2008, these transit reception centers were established in ten border 
crossing points.56
The costs of detention are only a first revelation of something larger or more com-
plex. The process of returning TCNs will also be extremely complex and costly for 
Albania when it comes to the return of more important numbers of irregular migrants 
to their country of origin or transit. When asked about TCNs, officials spoke only of 
the construction of the detention center. They did not mention any other costs and 
measures to be taken, such as the return to the country of origin. In reality, the return 
of important numbers of TCNs should pose for Albania the same problems of irregu-
lar migrants as for the EU member states.
The evaluation of the difficulties in implementing Albania’s obligation to readmit 
TCNs is related to the potential TCN caseload. The TCN clause of the RA entered 
into force in May 2008. From its entry into force until September 2008, sixteen for-
eign citizens of Nepalese, Indian, and Moldavian nationality have been admitted.57 
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However, it is too early to draw any conclusions on the potential caseload. 
Representatives of EU member states have encouraged their Albanian counterparts 
by suggesting that they are more likely to return TCNs to their country of origin, 
rather than to Albania as a country of transit.58 In fact, returning TCNs to Albania 
makes little sense, if they seek to return to the EU the next day. However, it has been 
acknowledged by EU experts that, where individuals cannot be returned to their coun-
try of origin, TCNs will be sent to Albania, if it can be proved that they have tran-
sited through Albania.59 In addition, it may prove easier and more cost-effective to 
send irregular TCNs to Albania than to their country of origin, and nothing in the RA 
prevents EU member states from doing so. Moreover, returns are difficult to predict 
also because they depend on the capacity of the EU member states to capture and 
detain irregular immigrants and on the political decisions on returning them.
In conclusion, the examination of the legal obligations taken by Albania through 
the RA and of the implementation of these commitments demonstrates that substan-
tial policy change has taken place in a period that begins in 2003 to 2004. Albania has 
not only adopted the necessary legislation but has also established the institutional 
mechanisms and taken the operational measures to comply with the EU demands in 
the area of readmission policy. Albania readmits all the Albanian and third-country 
nationals returned by the EU member states even in the absence of observation of 
return procedures by the latter. Thus, the degree of compliance with EU demands is 
very high in the period that follows the EU decision to make progress towards acces-
sion conditional on compliance in the area of migration policy.
Why Comply?
The article having so far established the temporal covariation of EU pressure and 
domestic change, this section will explore the causal mechanism linking the two 
variables. The connection between EU pressure and domestic change will be ren-
dered visible by examining the motivation of the actors involved in policy change in 
Albania. After having identified the domestic costs of compliance with EU demands 
in the area of readmission, I will explore why Albanian decision makers accepted 
EU conditions in this area despite those costs.
The previous section identified the financial costs of the readmission of TCNs 
and the risks of the “readmission trap.” With respect to Albanian nationals, one would 
expect domestic policy makers to consider emigration a means to ease political ten-
sions created by high unemployment rates and even a source of income, through 
migrant remittances. While the possibility for legal migration is almost inexistent, 
the return of large numbers of Albanian irregular migrants could lead to a decrease 
of remittances and exacerbate problems of poverty. Studies show that remittances 
are still vital to keep the economy going, contributing about 14 percent of GDP. The 
amount of remittances to Albania is three times as high as foreign net direct investment 
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and nearly twice as much as the official development aid received by Albania.60 It is 
generally agreed that remittances have been an important mechanism for alleviating 
poverty in Albania and for increasing family income above extreme low levels. 
According to the results of the Albanian Living Standard Measuring Survey in 2002, 
remittances from emigrants represented 13 percent of the average household income, 
while for recipient households they represented 47 percent of the household income.61 
Access to emigration is seen by many in the country as the only viable way out of 
poverty.62 A study by IOM in 2002 on the voluntary return of rejected asylum appli-
cants and irregular migrants who participated in the IOM voluntary return programs 
showed that the majority of the assisted returnees in the study was either being 
unemployed or facing difficulties in finding a suitable job.63 Thus, the government 
incurs not only financial but also social costs as a result of compliance. Therefore, 
the domestic equilibrium would induce Albanian policy makers not to be interested 
in the readmission of irregular migrants as a tool for a strict control of migration 
from the country into the EU states. But how did the Albanian policy makers and the 
public opinion perceive the costs of the readmission policy analyzed above? Why 
did Albania accept the readmission obligations? The following analysis will seek to 
answer these questions on the basis of interviews with negotiators of the RA and 
other officials involved in readmission, public declarations of representatives of the 
Albanian government and of political parties, as well as an analysis of press reports 
on the matter.
All the officials interviewed considered the conclusion of the RA inevitable as a 
precondition for the SAA and progress towards EU accession. Some officials men-
tioned the responsibility of a state to counter irregular emigration, but always in 
relation to the need to act as a partner with the EU. As a high official in MoI put it, 
“We have created many problems with our illegal migration to the EU countries. As 
Albanians, we should take our responsibilities and give guarantees.”64 When asked 
whether Albania could have negotiated better conditions for the RA, the Albanian 
negotiators recognize the weakness of their position. The EU having put the conclu-
sion of the agreement as a precondition for progress in the relations of the EU with 
the country, they felt they had to accept it. One of the principal negotiators argued that 
“more than negotiation, my experience, at least, shows it was an exam. We negotiated 
on the deadlines and derogation periods, not substance.”65 The Albanian negotiators 
did not have a clear picture of the implementation difficulties and the costs the coun-
try would have to incur. They point out that they had very little time to prepare and 
very limited expertise on readmission issues: “We analyzed the bilateral agreements, 
but we cannot say there was sufficient expertise. The Ministry of Public Order did not 
have special structures on readmission.”66 The experts of the Ministry of Public Order 
recognize their insufficient expertise pointing out that there was not any feasibility 
study on which to base the assessment of implementation difficulties.67 Asked about 
the benefits of the RA for the Albanian side, the negotiators considered the agreement 
as a fulfillment of a precondition for further progress in the relations with the EU. 
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They also mentioned the financial assistance of the EU, but none was able to 
quantify it.
As for the public positions on the RA, the government supported strongly the 
agreement as part of the EU conditions for negotiating the SAA. The correlation was 
also made clear in declarations made to the press by the then–minister for European 
Integration, Sokol Nako,68 and his successor, Ermelinda Meksi.69 Both ministers 
explicitly stated that the RA was part of the process of establishing border manage-
ment and security standards and of creating the institutions required for implementing 
the SAA. The same position was expressed in the press by one of the negotiators.70 
Only one politician of a junior opposition party stated that Albania should not pas-
sively accept all the EU conditions and should serve its national interests more.71 
However, there is no evidence of any involvement of the parliament and of the 
political parties in the negotiating process. It was treated as an exclusively govern-
mental issue. In July 2005, general elections in Albania brought to power the former 
opposition, which inherited thus the RA signed by the former government. Although 
members of the opposition had not been involved directly in the negotiations, the new 
government declared its commitment to signing the SAA as soon as possible. 
Therefore, it did not oppose ratification of the RA in parliament.72
The analysis of media reporting on the RA shows that the way the Albanian press 
dealt with the issue hardly amounts to a truly informed public debate. A review of 
articles on the RA published in the main daily newspapers73 reveals very limited 
media coverage and a lack of clear analysis and debate on the costs and benefits of 
the RA for Albanian society. Very few articles on the RA were published during the 
negotiation process. At the time of the first and second rounds of negotiations, the 
Albanian press published alarming reports that the EU and Albania might accept a 
British proposal to build a refugee camp in Albania. The promise of financial sup-
port for asylum centers and centers for other categories of irregular migrants was 
frequently mentioned as a benefit of the RA.74
Later on, the press echoed the government’s position that the RA was a success for 
the country in that it constituted the fulfillment of a precondition for progress in the 
path towards EU accession. Thus, the conclusion of the third round of negotiations 
was regarded by the media as a success for the Albanian government.75
After a period of silence, the signature of the RA in 2005 reawakened the interest 
of the press. The signature coincided with the campaign for national elections. In 
the period leading up to the elections, almost all the reviewed newspapers took a 
very critical view of the government’s actions generally. As a result, the coverage of 
the RA became very negative and assumed sometimes alarming notes. However, this 
criticism was instrumental to the election campaign and not based on a clear evalu-
ation of the costs and benefits of policy choices. The press articles of this period 
criticized the Albanian government for having accepted an agreement that would 
lead to the return of large numbers of Albanian emigrants.76 The press raised the fear of 
EU-wide operations for the identification of illegal immigrants.77 The article “Brussels, 
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the Return of Albanian Illegal Emigrants Is Signed”78 expressed the concern that the 
implementation procedures were not clear. In this context, the RA is considered by 
the Albanian press as a “gift” of the government to the EU.79 However, the instru-
mental use of this issue to attack the government during the election campaign is 
demonstrated by the fact that, when the new parliament ratified the RA in January 
2006, there was not any mentioning in the media of the fears raised during the elec-
tion campaign.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the media coverage is that 
the readmission policy was not object of an informed public debate that takes into 
account costs and benefits of policy choices. This lack of an informed public debate 
meant that the decision makers were acting free from societal pressure. This policy 
change depended on the preferences of policy makers alone. As for the perspective 
of decision makers, the interviews reveal that they accepted all the readmission 
obligations because they saw it as a precondition for progress towards EU member-
ship. The importance the elite attached to progress towards membership and the 
domestic structure characterized by the lack of veto points are the domestic factors 
that led to compliance.
Conclusion
The analysis of change in Albania’s readmission policy demonstrates that although 
the domestic costs of compliance are very significant, very high pressure from the EU 
has led to very good compliance results. The country has not only accepted the legal 
obligation to take back its citizens residing illegally in the EU and nationals of other 
countries who had reached the EU via Albania. It has also created the institutional 
and procedural conditions for implementation of those legal obligations and statisti-
cal data demonstrate that Albania is accepting all the illegal immigrants returned by 
the EU member states.
These developments have taken place despite their high domestic social costs, 
because the pressure exerted by the EU for compliance with its demands in this policy 
area was very high. The involvement of the countries of origin and transit in the fight 
against illegal migration is very high on the EU agenda. As a result, the Union tied 
compliance in this area to the progress towards accession. The signature of the SAA 
constitutes a step in the preaccession process and was therefore highly valued by the 
Albanian public officials and the public opinion at large. Thus, the critical facilitating 
domestic factor is the importance the ruling elite attaches to progress towards EU 
membership. An additional domestic factor that made possible compliance with the 
EU demands is the nature of the domestic structure in Albania where social forces 
have little influence on policy making and where policy change depends on the pref-
erences of policy makers.
Dedja / EU Conditionality in the Area of Migration Policy  17
This article demonstrates the crucial importance of gate-keeping in ensuring com-
pliance. The control by the EU of access to the stages of the preaccession process is 
such a powerful motivating instrument that it can outweigh very high domestic costs 
and even lead to developments in the aspirant country that are solely in the interest of 
the EU.
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